英語(yǔ)短文：私營(yíng)軍事公司的興起 5
Test case in Africa
[20] This week, MPRI expects to get government approval to go into Equatorial Guinea, an agreement that illustrates the questions some critics have with a so-called privatization of foreign policy.
[21] The contract was initially rejected by two State Department desks, holding it up for two years, Soyster says. It was approved only after MPRI lobbied the department's Africa desk, arguing that if it was not allowed to do the job, someone else would.
[22] Equatorial Guinea, most of which is an island off western Africa, will pay for the contract. It wants to develop a coast guard to protect its vast oil resources, which are being tapped by Mobil Oil, Soyster says.
[23] In doing so, the government could secure probably strengthen its grip on power.
[24] Yet the government of President Teodoro Obiang Nguema is a rampant violator of human rights, accused of political killings, election fraud, and questionable monetary practices, according to the 1999 State Department world report on Human Rights.
[25] Equatorial Guinea's closest allies seem to be North Korea and Cuba, and it was once the brunt of State Department jokes as the worst overseas post. In 1993, US ambassador John Bennett received a death threat for trying to save local political prisoners.
[26] "The question is, 'Do you want to train a military in modern techniques so it can preserve itself?'" says Arvind Ganesan, who follows the issue for Human Rights Watch.
[27] David Isenberg, an arms-control analyst at DynMeridian, a consulting firm, says PMCs are often used in these borderline situations, when working through official channels is either too cumbersome or politically difficult . "The administration likes it because it avoids the prospect of creating a furor if ( something goes wrong)," he says.
[28] But, he explains, the US needs to do a better job of regulating PMCs, which by and large are willing to follow clearly laid rules.
[29] "If the government wants to get the most out of them, they need to regulate them," he says. "That would quiet.. .fear that they could become rogues or soldiers of fortune."
非洲的試驗(yàn)案例
[20)軍事專業(yè)資源股份有限公司期待本周得到政府的批準(zhǔn)前往赤道幾內(nèi)亞，這項(xiàng)雙方達(dá)成的協(xié)議恰好說明了某些批評(píng)家指出的所謂對(duì)外政策私營(yíng)化的問題。
[21]索伊斯特說，國(guó)務(wù)院的兩個(gè)司最初都拒絕這項(xiàng)合同，使事情拖了兩年。公司向國(guó)務(wù)院非洲司做了疏通工作，講明即使不允許他們公司去做這項(xiàng)工作，也會(huì)有別人去做--只是在此之后，國(guó)務(wù)院才批準(zhǔn)。
[22]赤道幾內(nèi)亞的大部分領(lǐng)土是非洲西部海岸外的一座島嶼，上述合同所需經(jīng)費(fèi)將由該國(guó)支付。索伊斯特說，赤道幾內(nèi)亞希望建立一支海岸衛(wèi)隊(duì)來保護(hù)本國(guó)龐大的石油資源，這些資源正由美孚石油公司進(jìn)行開發(fā)。
[23]政府這樣做可能可以保持住甚至強(qiáng)化其政權(quán)。
[24]然而，據(jù)國(guó)務(wù)院1999年世界人權(quán)報(bào)告介紹，特奧多羅·奧比昂·恩圭馬總統(tǒng)的政府是一個(gè)瘋狂踐踏人權(quán)的政府，他被指責(zé)進(jìn)行政治屠殺、在選舉中舞弊，而且在金融幣制方面也有問題。
[25]赤道幾內(nèi)亞最親密的盟國(guó)好像是朝鮮和古巴，國(guó)務(wù)院有些人開玩笑時(shí)曾首當(dāng)其沖地戲稱該國(guó)為最差的海外崗位。1993年，美國(guó)大使約翰·貝內(nèi)特因盡力解救當(dāng)?shù)氐恼畏付盏搅怂劳鐾{。
[26]阿爾溫德·加內(nèi)桑為《人權(quán)觀察》工作，一直跟蹤研究這個(gè)問題。他說："問題是，'你希望用現(xiàn)代技術(shù)訓(xùn)練出一支可以自我保存下來的軍隊(duì)嗎?'"
[27]戴維·伊森伯格是DynMeridian咨詢公司的軍備控制分析家。他說，當(dāng)遇到官方渠道做工作受到阻礙或政治上有困難等不確定情況時(shí)，就常常使用私營(yíng)軍事公司。"政府喜歡這樣，因?yàn)槿绻?發(fā)生什么問題)，這可以避免引起抗議浪潮。"
[28]但是，他解釋說，美國(guó)需要更好地對(duì)私營(yíng)軍事公司進(jìn)行規(guī)范管理，總的來說，這些公司愿意遵循明確制定的規(guī)章。
[29]“如果政府想充分利用他們，就需要對(duì)他們進(jìn)行規(guī)范管理，”他說。“那會(huì)平息……害怕他們會(huì)成為惡棍流氓或兵痞的恐懼心理。”
Test case in Africa
[20] This week, MPRI expects to get government approval to go into Equatorial Guinea, an agreement that illustrates the questions some critics have with a so-called privatization of foreign policy.
[21] The contract was initially rejected by two State Department desks, holding it up for two years, Soyster says. It was approved only after MPRI lobbied the department's Africa desk, arguing that if it was not allowed to do the job, someone else would.
[22] Equatorial Guinea, most of which is an island off western Africa, will pay for the contract. It wants to develop a coast guard to protect its vast oil resources, which are being tapped by Mobil Oil, Soyster says.
[23] In doing so, the government could secure probably strengthen its grip on power.
[24] Yet the government of President Teodoro Obiang Nguema is a rampant violator of human rights, accused of political killings, election fraud, and questionable monetary practices, according to the 1999 State Department world report on Human Rights.
[25] Equatorial Guinea's closest allies seem to be North Korea and Cuba, and it was once the brunt of State Department jokes as the worst overseas post. In 1993, US ambassador John Bennett received a death threat for trying to save local political prisoners.
[26] "The question is, 'Do you want to train a military in modern techniques so it can preserve itself?'" says Arvind Ganesan, who follows the issue for Human Rights Watch.
[27] David Isenberg, an arms-control analyst at DynMeridian, a consulting firm, says PMCs are often used in these borderline situations, when working through official channels is either too cumbersome or politically difficult . "The administration likes it because it avoids the prospect of creating a furor if ( something goes wrong)," he says.
[28] But, he explains, the US needs to do a better job of regulating PMCs, which by and large are willing to follow clearly laid rules.
[29] "If the government wants to get the most out of them, they need to regulate them," he says. "That would quiet.. .fear that they could become rogues or soldiers of fortune."
非洲的試驗(yàn)案例
[20)軍事專業(yè)資源股份有限公司期待本周得到政府的批準(zhǔn)前往赤道幾內(nèi)亞，這項(xiàng)雙方達(dá)成的協(xié)議恰好說明了某些批評(píng)家指出的所謂對(duì)外政策私營(yíng)化的問題。
[21]索伊斯特說，國(guó)務(wù)院的兩個(gè)司最初都拒絕這項(xiàng)合同，使事情拖了兩年。公司向國(guó)務(wù)院非洲司做了疏通工作，講明即使不允許他們公司去做這項(xiàng)工作，也會(huì)有別人去做--只是在此之后，國(guó)務(wù)院才批準(zhǔn)。
[22]赤道幾內(nèi)亞的大部分領(lǐng)土是非洲西部海岸外的一座島嶼，上述合同所需經(jīng)費(fèi)將由該國(guó)支付。索伊斯特說，赤道幾內(nèi)亞希望建立一支海岸衛(wèi)隊(duì)來保護(hù)本國(guó)龐大的石油資源，這些資源正由美孚石油公司進(jìn)行開發(fā)。
[23]政府這樣做可能可以保持住甚至強(qiáng)化其政權(quán)。
[24]然而，據(jù)國(guó)務(wù)院1999年世界人權(quán)報(bào)告介紹，特奧多羅·奧比昂·恩圭馬總統(tǒng)的政府是一個(gè)瘋狂踐踏人權(quán)的政府，他被指責(zé)進(jìn)行政治屠殺、在選舉中舞弊，而且在金融幣制方面也有問題。
[25]赤道幾內(nèi)亞最親密的盟國(guó)好像是朝鮮和古巴，國(guó)務(wù)院有些人開玩笑時(shí)曾首當(dāng)其沖地戲稱該國(guó)為最差的海外崗位。1993年，美國(guó)大使約翰·貝內(nèi)特因盡力解救當(dāng)?shù)氐恼畏付盏搅怂劳鐾{。
[26]阿爾溫德·加內(nèi)桑為《人權(quán)觀察》工作，一直跟蹤研究這個(gè)問題。他說："問題是，'你希望用現(xiàn)代技術(shù)訓(xùn)練出一支可以自我保存下來的軍隊(duì)嗎?'"
[27]戴維·伊森伯格是DynMeridian咨詢公司的軍備控制分析家。他說，當(dāng)遇到官方渠道做工作受到阻礙或政治上有困難等不確定情況時(shí)，就常常使用私營(yíng)軍事公司。"政府喜歡這樣，因?yàn)槿绻?發(fā)生什么問題)，這可以避免引起抗議浪潮。"
[28]但是，他解釋說，美國(guó)需要更好地對(duì)私營(yíng)軍事公司進(jìn)行規(guī)范管理，總的來說，這些公司愿意遵循明確制定的規(guī)章。
[29]“如果政府想充分利用他們，就需要對(duì)他們進(jìn)行規(guī)范管理，”他說。“那會(huì)平息……害怕他們會(huì)成為惡棍流氓或兵痞的恐懼心理。”
