Centrally clearedderivatives;Clear and present danger

　　集中清算衍生品交易;迫在眉睫的危機(jī);

　　Clearing-houses may add danger as well asefficiency;

　　清算所的危險和效率料并行上升;

　　Stock exchanges have not been lucky in loverecently. Deutsche Borse s proposed merger withNYSE Euronext was blocked by regulators inFebruary. Romances between the exchanges ofSingapore and Australia, and between the Toronto bourse and the London Stock Exchange, have also fizzled.

　　證券交易所近期的聯(lián)姻不那么順利。德國證券交易所與紐約泛歐交易所集團(tuán)的合并提議2月份被監(jiān)管當(dāng)局否決。而新加坡和澳大利亞證券交易所的聯(lián)姻以及多倫多證券交易所和倫敦證券交易所的聯(lián)姻也都已擱淺。

　　Tired of such dalliances, the LSE has taken up with the plumber. On April 3rd itsshareholders backed its plan to take control of LCH.Clearnet, a big clearing-house.Clearing-houses are the back-room wizards of the exchange-traded securities andderivatives markets. They ensure that once a deal has been agreed upon it will be honoured,even if one of the parties goes bust. The 2008 financial crisis proved their worth. Interbankmarkets seized up because no bank knew how big a risk the other was carrying, but theclearing-houses had a much better idea of their exposures and could rapidly demand morecash or other collateral from counterparties.

　　LSE厭倦了此類周旋， 開始對管道工產(chǎn)生興趣。4月3日該集團(tuán)股東支持掌控LCH.Clearnet的計(jì)劃，LCH.Clearnet是一家大型清算所。清算所是股票交易和衍生品市場的幕后向?qū)АＫ麄兇_保一旦交易達(dá)成，就會生效，即使交易一方破產(chǎn)。2008年發(fā)生的金融危機(jī)證明了清算所的價值。銀行間市場失靈，因銀行不知彼此擔(dān)負(fù)多大的風(fēng)險，但清算所對其敞口卻知之甚詳，進(jìn)而可快速的要求交易方提供更多現(xiàn)金或其他抵押品。

　　Regulators now want clearing-houses to act as central counterparties for as manyderivatives transactions as possible. Their biggest target is the mountain of over-the-counter derivatives products, whose notional amounts outstanding, reckoned at around 700trillion dollar in June 2011, easily dwarf the 83 trillion dollar of derivatives on exchanges.

　　目前監(jiān)管當(dāng)局想讓清算所扮演中央對手方的角色，盡可能多的為衍生品交易進(jìn)行清算。其最大的目標(biāo)是大量的衍生品柜臺交易，2011年7月OTC名義總值約達(dá)700萬億美元，而交易所的衍生品交易名義總值為83萬億美元，明顯低很多。

　　Some OTC derivatives are already centrally cleared: LCH.Clearnet s Swap Clear service has290 trillion dollar of interest-swaps on its books. Many are not. A G20 resolution in 2009 seta framework for moving standardised OTC products into clearing-houses. This is beingapplied through bits of legislation worldwide, most importantly via the Dodd-Frank Act inAmerica and the European Market Infrastructure Regulation in Europe, which wasvoted through the European Parliament on March 29th. Any remaining bilateral deals wouldbe much more expensive for banks to carry on their books.

　　部分衍生品柜臺交易已被集中清算： LCH.Clearnet的掉期清算業(yè)務(wù)中利率掉期賬面值達(dá)290萬億美元。但多數(shù)OTC衍生品交易并未進(jìn)行清算。2009年頒布的一項(xiàng)20國集團(tuán)決議為標(biāo)準(zhǔn)化OTC產(chǎn)品進(jìn)入清算所制定了一個框架。這一框架可通過世界范圍內(nèi)的零星立法來實(shí)施，最重要的立法有美國的多德弗蘭克法案和歐洲的歐洲市場基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施監(jiān)管條例，該條例于3月29日獲歐洲議會投票通過。剩下的雙邊交易對銀行來說都要昂貴得多。

　　All of which means that the volume of business flowing to clearing-houses, and the fees theycan charge, will rise. For a stock exchange like the LSE, whose trading volume in cashequities is being eroded by much cheaper multilateral platforms, it makes sense to riskoverpayingthe deal values LCH.Clearnet at around 800m to secure abusiness that is almost bound to grow by regulatory fiat.

　　所有這些都意味著流向清算所的業(yè)務(wù)量，及其收取的費(fèi)用會增加。對于像LSE 這樣的證券交易所來說，其股票現(xiàn)貨交易量將受到更便宜的多邊交易平臺打壓，冒險多掏錢購入一項(xiàng)在監(jiān)管法令下勢必會增長的業(yè)務(wù)是有意義的。LSE購入 LCH.Clearnet 股權(quán)的交易額約達(dá)8億歐元。

　　Others are also crowding round. NYSE Euronext s merger with Deutsche Borse would haveplugged it into Eurex Clearing, the German exchange s CCP. Now it will work on making NYSELiffe Clearing, which clears the trades on London s Liffe futures exchange, a full CCP. OnMarch 28th it announced plans for its continental derivatives-clearing activity to migratethere by early 2023, subject to regulatory approval .

　　其他交易所亦前仆后繼。紐約泛歐交易所集團(tuán)與德國證券交易所的合并本可與歐洲期交所清算公司拉上關(guān)系，歐洲期交所清算公司是德國證券交易所的CCP。目前紐約泛歐交易所集團(tuán)將致力于打造泛歐交易所清算所，該清算所清算倫敦國際期貨金融交易所的期貨交易，完全是一個CCP。3月28日LSE宣布計(jì)劃在2023年初將其衍生品清算業(yè)務(wù)擴(kuò)張至歐洲大陸，而這取決于監(jiān)管當(dāng)局的許可。

　　This will create new concentrations of risk. If the CCPs consolidate into three or four bigplayers in Europe, and a handful more worldwide, that will be a lot of risk tied up in a fewinstitutions. Since they are involved in cross-border business and meant to beinteroperableie, allowing access to a wide number of counterpartiesthe responsibility forthe bail-out of a CCP may not be a clear-cut geographical one. All this should be sorted outbefore the game goes much further.

　　新風(fēng)險集中將應(yīng)運(yùn)而生。如果歐洲的CCPs整合成三或四個大機(jī)構(gòu)，全球則整合成稍多幾個，那么大量風(fēng)險就將會被集中在幾個機(jī)構(gòu)上面。因?yàn)檫@些機(jī)構(gòu)的業(yè)務(wù)涉及跨境，意味著會相互影響，即業(yè)務(wù)向更廣泛的交易方開放，那么要負(fù)責(zé)救助一個CCP，或許就不是地理上明確劃分的那一個了。在進(jìn)一步整合之前，所有這些問題都應(yīng)解決。

　　Another looming problem is the quality of collateral that CCPs take. Apart from cash, themost common type of collateral posted with clearing-houses is government bonds. These nolonger have the risk-free status they used to enjoy. As more deals migrate to CCPs, thepressure to find suitable collateral could intensify .There is a risk that clearing-houses could expose themselves to assets which are not asstable as they should be.

　　另一個若隱若現(xiàn)的問題是CCP接受的抵押品質(zhì)量問題。除現(xiàn)金外，清算所接受的最普遍抵押品是政府債券。而這些債券已不再是過去享有的無風(fēng)險地位。隨著更多交易轉(zhuǎn)向CCP，其找尋合適抵押品的壓力料加劇。這就存在一種風(fēng)險：清算所面臨的資產(chǎn)敞口不如應(yīng)該那樣穩(wěn)定。

　　Clearers swear blind that they would never relax their standards. We re not plumbers, we rerisk-management firms, says Ian Axe, the boss of LCH.Clearnet. This is true, but it andmany other CCPs are run for profit, and are bound to steer a course between risk andreward. The European Securities and Markets Authority is supposed to set new capital rulesand collateral standards for CCPs by June 30th. What regulators give with one hand, theymay take away with the other.

　　清算所誓言決不會放寬標(biāo)準(zhǔn)。LCH.Clearnet老板Ian Axe表示：我們不是管道工，我們是風(fēng)險管理公司。雖然這是事實(shí)，但LCH.Clearnet和其他CCP都是逐利的公司，定會在風(fēng)險和收益之間前行。歐洲證券與市場管理局應(yīng)在7月30日前為CCP制定新的資本規(guī)則和抵押標(biāo)準(zhǔn)。上有政策，也許下就有對策。

　　Centrally clearedderivatives;Clear and present danger

　　集中清算衍生品交易;迫在眉睫的危機(jī);

　　Clearing-houses may add danger as well asefficiency;

　　清算所的危險和效率料并行上升;

　　Stock exchanges have not been lucky in loverecently. Deutsche Borse s proposed merger withNYSE Euronext was blocked by regulators inFebruary. Romances between the exchanges ofSingapore and Australia, and between the Toronto bourse and the London Stock Exchange, have also fizzled.

　　證券交易所近期的聯(lián)姻不那么順利。德國證券交易所與紐約泛歐交易所集團(tuán)的合并提議2月份被監(jiān)管當(dāng)局否決。而新加坡和澳大利亞證券交易所的聯(lián)姻以及多倫多證券交易所和倫敦證券交易所的聯(lián)姻也都已擱淺。

　　Tired of such dalliances, the LSE has taken up with the plumber. On April 3rd itsshareholders backed its plan to take control of LCH.Clearnet, a big clearing-house.Clearing-houses are the back-room wizards of the exchange-traded securities andderivatives markets. They ensure that once a deal has been agreed upon it will be honoured,even if one of the parties goes bust. The 2008 financial crisis proved their worth. Interbankmarkets seized up because no bank knew how big a risk the other was carrying, but theclearing-houses had a much better idea of their exposures and could rapidly demand morecash or other collateral from counterparties.

　　LSE厭倦了此類周旋， 開始對管道工產(chǎn)生興趣。4月3日該集團(tuán)股東支持掌控LCH.Clearnet的計(jì)劃，LCH.Clearnet是一家大型清算所。清算所是股票交易和衍生品市場的幕后向?qū)АＫ麄兇_保一旦交易達(dá)成，就會生效，即使交易一方破產(chǎn)。2008年發(fā)生的金融危機(jī)證明了清算所的價值。銀行間市場失靈，因銀行不知彼此擔(dān)負(fù)多大的風(fēng)險，但清算所對其敞口卻知之甚詳，進(jìn)而可快速的要求交易方提供更多現(xiàn)金或其他抵押品。

　　Regulators now want clearing-houses to act as central counterparties for as manyderivatives transactions as possible. Their biggest target is the mountain of over-the-counter derivatives products, whose notional amounts outstanding, reckoned at around 700trillion dollar in June 2011, easily dwarf the 83 trillion dollar of derivatives on exchanges.

　　目前監(jiān)管當(dāng)局想讓清算所扮演中央對手方的角色，盡可能多的為衍生品交易進(jìn)行清算。其最大的目標(biāo)是大量的衍生品柜臺交易，2011年7月OTC名義總值約達(dá)700萬億美元，而交易所的衍生品交易名義總值為83萬億美元，明顯低很多。

　　Some OTC derivatives are already centrally cleared: LCH.Clearnet s Swap Clear service has290 trillion dollar of interest-swaps on its books. Many are not. A G20 resolution in 2009 seta framework for moving standardised OTC products into clearing-houses. This is beingapplied through bits of legislation worldwide, most importantly via the Dodd-Frank Act inAmerica and the European Market Infrastructure Regulation in Europe, which wasvoted through the European Parliament on March 29th. Any remaining bilateral deals wouldbe much more expensive for banks to carry on their books.

　　部分衍生品柜臺交易已被集中清算： LCH.Clearnet的掉期清算業(yè)務(wù)中利率掉期賬面值達(dá)290萬億美元。但多數(shù)OTC衍生品交易并未進(jìn)行清算。2009年頒布的一項(xiàng)20國集團(tuán)決議為標(biāo)準(zhǔn)化OTC產(chǎn)品進(jìn)入清算所制定了一個框架。這一框架可通過世界范圍內(nèi)的零星立法來實(shí)施，最重要的立法有美國的多德弗蘭克法案和歐洲的歐洲市場基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施監(jiān)管條例，該條例于3月29日獲歐洲議會投票通過。剩下的雙邊交易對銀行來說都要昂貴得多。

　　All of which means that the volume of business flowing to clearing-houses, and the fees theycan charge, will rise. For a stock exchange like the LSE, whose trading volume in cashequities is being eroded by much cheaper multilateral platforms, it makes sense to riskoverpayingthe deal values LCH.Clearnet at around 800m to secure abusiness that is almost bound to grow by regulatory fiat.

　　所有這些都意味著流向清算所的業(yè)務(wù)量，及其收取的費(fèi)用會增加。對于像LSE 這樣的證券交易所來說，其股票現(xiàn)貨交易量將受到更便宜的多邊交易平臺打壓，冒險多掏錢購入一項(xiàng)在監(jiān)管法令下勢必會增長的業(yè)務(wù)是有意義的。LSE購入 LCH.Clearnet 股權(quán)的交易額約達(dá)8億歐元。

　　Others are also crowding round. NYSE Euronext s merger with Deutsche Borse would haveplugged it into Eurex Clearing, the German exchange s CCP. Now it will work on making NYSELiffe Clearing, which clears the trades on London s Liffe futures exchange, a full CCP. OnMarch 28th it announced plans for its continental derivatives-clearing activity to migratethere by early 2023, subject to regulatory approval .

　　其他交易所亦前仆后繼。紐約泛歐交易所集團(tuán)與德國證券交易所的合并本可與歐洲期交所清算公司拉上關(guān)系，歐洲期交所清算公司是德國證券交易所的CCP。目前紐約泛歐交易所集團(tuán)將致力于打造泛歐交易所清算所，該清算所清算倫敦國際期貨金融交易所的期貨交易，完全是一個CCP。3月28日LSE宣布計(jì)劃在2023年初將其衍生品清算業(yè)務(wù)擴(kuò)張至歐洲大陸，而這取決于監(jiān)管當(dāng)局的許可。

　　This will create new concentrations of risk. If the CCPs consolidate into three or four bigplayers in Europe, and a handful more worldwide, that will be a lot of risk tied up in a fewinstitutions. Since they are involved in cross-border business and meant to beinteroperableie, allowing access to a wide number of counterpartiesthe responsibility forthe bail-out of a CCP may not be a clear-cut geographical one. All this should be sorted outbefore the game goes much further.

　　新風(fēng)險集中將應(yīng)運(yùn)而生。如果歐洲的CCPs整合成三或四個大機(jī)構(gòu)，全球則整合成稍多幾個，那么大量風(fēng)險就將會被集中在幾個機(jī)構(gòu)上面。因?yàn)檫@些機(jī)構(gòu)的業(yè)務(wù)涉及跨境，意味著會相互影響，即業(yè)務(wù)向更廣泛的交易方開放，那么要負(fù)責(zé)救助一個CCP，或許就不是地理上明確劃分的那一個了。在進(jìn)一步整合之前，所有這些問題都應(yīng)解決。

　　Another looming problem is the quality of collateral that CCPs take. Apart from cash, themost common type of collateral posted with clearing-houses is government bonds. These nolonger have the risk-free status they used to enjoy. As more deals migrate to CCPs, thepressure to find suitable collateral could intensify .There is a risk that clearing-houses could expose themselves to assets which are not asstable as they should be.

　　另一個若隱若現(xiàn)的問題是CCP接受的抵押品質(zhì)量問題。除現(xiàn)金外，清算所接受的最普遍抵押品是政府債券。而這些債券已不再是過去享有的無風(fēng)險地位。隨著更多交易轉(zhuǎn)向CCP，其找尋合適抵押品的壓力料加劇。這就存在一種風(fēng)險：清算所面臨的資產(chǎn)敞口不如應(yīng)該那樣穩(wěn)定。

　　Clearers swear blind that they would never relax their standards. We re not plumbers, we rerisk-management firms, says Ian Axe, the boss of LCH.Clearnet. This is true, but it andmany other CCPs are run for profit, and are bound to steer a course between risk andreward. The European Securities and Markets Authority is supposed to set new capital rulesand collateral standards for CCPs by June 30th. What regulators give with one hand, theymay take away with the other.

　　清算所誓言決不會放寬標(biāo)準(zhǔn)。LCH.Clearnet老板Ian Axe表示：我們不是管道工，我們是風(fēng)險管理公司。雖然這是事實(shí)，但LCH.Clearnet和其他CCP都是逐利的公司，定會在風(fēng)險和收益之間前行。歐洲證券與市場管理局應(yīng)在7月30日前為CCP制定新的資本規(guī)則和抵押標(biāo)準(zhǔn)。上有政策，也許下就有對策。